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CRIMINAL LAW-Whether the Elements of Deliberation
and Premeditation Adequately Distinguish First Degree
Murder from Second Degree Murder: State v. Garcia
I.

INTRODUCTION

New Mexico, like many other jurisdictions, uses the elements of deliberation and premeditation to distinguish first degree murder from second
degree murder; however, for both practical and theoretical reasons, both2
of these elements serve as inadequate distinctions.' In State v. Garcia,
the New Mexico Supreme Court tried to clarify this "deliberate and
premeditated" distinction. This Note provides an overview of the deliberation and premeditation elements of first degree murder, discusses the
rationale of the Garcia decision, analyzes the facts of Garcia under state
laws from other jurisdictions, and evaluates whether Garcia provides
adequate standards to help determine what evidence will help prove the
deliberate intent to kill.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

David Garcia was convicted of first degree murder for the stabbing
death of Ray Gutierrez. 3 The stabbing occurred at a house party that
both Garcia and Gutierrez attended on April 27, 1990. Clara Pelland,
Gutierrez's girlfriend, witnessed the stabbing and testified at Garcia's
trial.
Pelland testified that Garcia and Gutierrez argued throughout the party.
At one point she heard Garcia say, "Remove Ray [Gutierrez] away from
me or you're not going to be seeing him for the rest of the day." Pelland
stated that when she later looked for Garcia and Gutierrez in the back
yard of the house, she was told that they had gone to the front yard.
When Pelland found them there she saw Garcia stab Gutierrez in the
chest. Pelland then grabbed Gutierrez and shouted at Garcia, "Look
what you did to my boyfriend." Garcia replied, "I'm going to mess you
up like I messed up your boyfriend. I'll be seeing you soon."
After the stabbing, Garcia fled and the police searched the area for
him. Garcia eventually turned himself in and told the police, "I did it.
I did it. I'm not ashamed to admit it. I told my brother I did him and
I'd do him again."

1. Leo M. Romero, A Critique of the Willful, Deliberate, and Premeditated Formula for
Distinguishing Between First and Second Degree Murder in New Mexico, 18 N.M. L. REV. 73, 83
(1988).
2. 114 N.M. 269, 837 P.2d 862 (1992).
3. Refer to Garcia, 114 N.M. at 269-71, 837 P.2d at 862-64, for a complete statement of the
facts of the case.
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At trial, Garcia moved for a directed verdict arguing that the State
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific intent
required to commit first degree murder. The trial court denied his motion,
and Garcia was convicted of first degree murder.
On appeal, the New Mexico Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial
court erred when it denied Garcia's motion for a directed verdict. In its
analysis, the court acknowledged that the standard of review of a trial
court's ruling on a defendant's motion for a directed verdict was not
clear in New Mexico. Consequently, the supreme court explained the
standard as requiring an appellate court to first "view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, resolving all conflicts and indulging
all permissible inferences in favor of a verdict of conviction." 5 Secondly,
an appellate court must then evaluate the evidence to determine whether
a jury could rationally reach its verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. 6
In Garcia, the supreme court applied the requisite standard of review
and reversed Garcia's conviction for first degree murder. It then remanded
the case for a new trial on the offenses of second degree murder and
voluntary manslaughter. 7 In its analysis, the court stated that because
the State failed to show that Garcia weighed the considerations for and
against killing Gutierrez, it had failed to establish that Garcia formed
the requisite deliberate intent for first degree murder.8
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Most jurisdictions classify murder into two separate degrees. 9 This
concept of separate classification originated from the Pennsylvania Reform
Act of 1794 (the Act), which was designed to primarily confine the most
severe punishments, such as the death penalty, to first degree murder. 0
Consequently, the Act classified murders involving a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill as first degree murder and classified all other
murders as second degree murder."
A. Analysis of the Deliberation and Premeditation Elements
Contained under the New Mexico Murder Statute
The substantial difference in penalties for first and second degree murder
in New Mexico highlights the need for careful distinction of each classification's elements. The New Mexico homicide statute, like those in
many other jurisdictions, defines first degree murder in part as any kind

4. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 273-74, 837 P.2d at 866-67.
5. Id. at 274, 837 P.2d at 866 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) and State v.
Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (1988)).
6. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
and State v. Sutphin, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314 (1988)).
7. Id. at 276, 837 P.2d at 869.
8. Id. at 275, 837 P.2d at 868.
9. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.7 (2d ed. 1986).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 commentary at 16 (1980).
11. Id.
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of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. 12 The statute defines second
degree murder as a homicide in which the killer knows his or her acts
will create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. 3 Persons
convicted of first degree murder are sentenced to death or to life
imprisonment14 and must serve a minimum of thirty years before becoming
eligible for parole. 5 However, persons convicted of second degree murder
are sentenced to a maximum of nine years imprisonment.' 6 Because of
this significant disparity between the penalties imposed for each separate
classification of murder, it is very important to clearly distinguish the
required elements for first degree murder from those of second degree
murder.
The present New Mexico homicide statute does not contain any provisions outlining what evidence will support either a first or second degree
murder conviction.' 7 In fact, none of the terms contained within the first
and second degree murder sections are specifically defined under any
section of the New Mexico homicide statute. Consequently, the general
definitions of these terms provide the only comprehensive guidance.
Wharton's Criminal Law defines the first degree murder term "willful"
to mean the intent to kill, 18 the term "premeditation" to mean the process
of thinking about killing before engaging in homicidal conduct, 9 and
the term "deliberation" to mean the process of carefully weighing the
alternatives of killing or not killing. E0 The second degree murder term
"knows" generally means that the person is aware that his or her conduct
will cause a certain result. 2'
Although the first and second degree murder sections have different
requirements for mental culpability, the two statutes have been construed
to have some of the same mens rea elements. For instance, the New
Mexico Court of Appeals in State v. Johnson22 interpreted the second
degree murder statute to include intentional killings. 23 From this interpretation in Johnson, it follows that premeditation must also be an
element of second degree murder because a killer would first have to
think about the act of killing before forming the actual intent to kill.2
Therefore, the element of premeditation is required for both first and

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1(A)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
Id. § 30-2-1(B).
Id. § 31-21-10(a).
Id. § 31-18-14.
Id. § 31-18-15(A)(2).
See id. § 30-2-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
2 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 139 (14th ed. 1979).
19. TORCIA, supra note 18, § 140.
20. Id.
21. LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 9, § 3.5 n. I I (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Official
Draft 1962)).
22. 103 N.M. 364, 707 P.2d 1174 (Ct. App.), cert. quashed, 103 N.M. 344, 707 P.2d 552 (1985).
23. Id. at 370, 707 P.2d at 1180.
24. Dean Romero stated in his article that the term "willful" presumably means intentional and
the term "premeditation" suggests that either the intent to kill preceded the act of killing or that
the actor thought about killing before forming the intent to kill. Romero, supra note 1, at 83.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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second degree murder, and the only actual distinction between the two
classifications of murder is the element of deliberation.
B.

Analysis of the Uniform Jury Instruction Defining Deliberation
Although no statutory provision defines deliberation, the New Mexico
Uniform Jury Instructions do:
The word deliberate means arrived at or determined upon as a result
of careful thought and the weighing of the consideration for and
against the proposed course of action. A calculated judgment and
decision may be arrived at in a short period of time. A mere unconsidered and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to
kill, is not a deliberate intention to kill. To constitute a deliberate
killing, the slayer must weigh and consider the question of killing
and his reasons for and against such a choice.25
In sum, the jury instruction provides that a person must weigh and
consider the act of killing before commencing this act.2 Moreover, this
instruction stipulates that the person's thought process may occur within
a short period of time; however, a person who has acted upon a rash
27
impulse has not formed a deliberate intent to kill.
Although jury instruction 14-201 defines deliberation, it does not outline
the evidence required to show a deliberate intent to kill. 28 For instance,
the instruction states that a deliberate intent can be formed in a short
period of time, but the instruction does not state how much time is
sufficient. Also, the instruction provides that the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and his or her reasons for and against
such a choice, but the instruction does not provide any guidelines as to
what the jury should consider when determining whether the slayer actually
went through this process.
Consequently, the jurors will probably apply their own conceptions of
what deliberation means and implement their own standards to decide
what evidence will satisfy the deliberate intent to kill. 29 To avoid this
problem, the jury instruction should at least provide some guidelines as
to what evidence will help prove a deliberate intent to kill.
C.

Alternatives to the Deliberation Distinction
One way to clearly distinguish first degree murder from second degree
murder is to eliminate the deliberation element altogether from the New

25. N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CRIM. 14-201.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. In State v. Ortega, 112 N.M. 554, 567 n.13, 817 P.2d 1196, 1209 n.13 (1991), the New
Mexico Supreme Court expressed reservations about the elaborations contained within Uniform Jury
Instruction 14-201 such as: .'careful thought,' 'consideration for and against,' and 'weigh[ing] and
consider[ing] the question of killing and the reasons for and against the choice."'
29. Without standards for the kind of evidence that is sufficient to sustain a finding
of a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, the application of the deliberation
formula requires no more than an intent to take away the life of another and
makes meaningless the legislative classification of intentional murder into two degrees.
Romero, supra note 1, at 91-92.
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Mexico murder statute. 0 The drafters of the Model Penal Code as well
as other jurisdictions have recognized the confusion that often results
when trying to construe the deliberation term; therefore, they chose not
to define murder with this term.
1. Model Penal Code
The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) did not separately classify
murder into first and second degree murder.' Instead, they outlined the
culpability requirements for murder under one section. The MPC defines
murder under section 210.2(1) as the act of killing committed either
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.3 2 A person acts purposefully when
she has the objective to consciously engage in certain conduct and is33
aware or believes or hopes that certain attendant circumstances exist.
A person acts knowingly when she is aware of her conduct, that certain34
circumstances exist, and that her conduct will cause a certain result.
she acts in conscious disregard of
Finally, a person acts recklessly when
35
a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
By defining each element of mental culpability, the drafters of the
MPC have outlined the specific circumstances necessary to prove the
mens rea elements under section 210.2 of the MPC murder provision.
Thus, the MPC provides adequate guidance as to what will prove the
required elements of murder.
In addition, without classifying murder into two separate categories,
the MPC drafters managed to include a provision to punish those murders
which warrant the death penalty.36 Therefore, without eliminating capital
punishment, the drafters have effectively eliminated the problems that
the courts and juries often experience when interpreting the deliberation
term.
2. Other Jurisdictions
Some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, Illinois, and Connecticut, also
do not use the deliberation element to distinguish first degree murder
from second degree murder. For instance, Delaware classifies murder into
two categories, but uses the elements of "intent" and "recklessness" to

30. Dean Romero suggested in his article that the legislature altogether eliminate the deliberation
element for distinguishing between first and second degree murder. Instead, he recommended that
the legislature follow the Model Penal Code as well as other jurisdictions and specifically list the
circumstances that warrant a first degree murder conviction. Romero, supra note I, at 93.
31. The drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) believed that the classification of murder into
two separate categories was fundamentally unsound. "Crudely put, the judgment is that the person
who plans ahead is worse than the person who kills on sudden impulse. This generalization does
not, however, survive analysis." MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 commentary at 127 (1980).
32. Id. § 210.2(1).
33. Id. § 2.02(2)(a).
34. Id. § 2.02(2)(b).
35. Id. § 2.02(c).
36. Id. § 210.6(3).
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distinguish first degree murder from second degree murder.' Under the
Delaware statute, first degree murder consists of intentionally causing the
death of another person while second degree murder occurs when a person
recklessly causes the death of another person under circumstances which
manifest a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to human life. 8
Similarly, Illinois provides that a crime constitutes first degree murder
when (1) a person intends to kill or do great bodily harm to an individual
or knows that his or her acts will cause death to that individual, or (2)
the person knows that his or her acts create a strong probability of death
or great bodily harm.3 9 The Illinois second degree murder statute provides
that if certain mitigating factors are present which contribute to provoke
or justify a killing described under the first degree murder provision,
then a person will be guilty of second degree murder.40
Connecticut uses a different approach. It does not separate murder
into first and second degree, but rather sets out only one statutory section
for murder . 4 1 The commentaries under Connecticut's murder section provide insight as to why the Connecticut legislature eliminated the premeditation and deliberation elements from its statute:
Under this inevitable formulation-inevitable because of the impossibility of a definition based upon length of time-the determination
of premeditation frequently amounts to an exercise in semantics, and
the jury's decision of a matter of life and death turns upon an issue
which is, at best, vague and confusing and which has troubled judges
and attorneys throughout legal history.42
These commentaries reveal that Connecticut, like Delaware and Illinois,
has chosen to simplify the process of construing the required elements
necessary to prove murder by specifically excluding the deliberation element from its statute.
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE GARCIA DECISION

The supreme court acknowledged in Garciathe lack of a clear distinction
between first and second degree murder in New Mexico.4 3 Consequently,
the court tried to articulate an intelligible difference between the two
classifications of murder. The court explained that the New Mexico
homicide statute consists of two separate categories of intentional killings.4

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635-36 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
38. Id.
39. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993).

37.

40. Id. para. 5/9-2(a). The mitigating factors are: (1) whether the killer was acting under sudden
and intense passion and (2) whether the killer reasonably believed that certain circumstances existed
that justified the killing. Id.
41. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a(a) (West 1985) provides that "[a] person is guilty of
murder when, with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person or causes a suicide by force, duress or deception."
42. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54 comm'n cmt. (West 1985).
43. Garcia, 114 N.M. at 272, 837 P.2d at 865.
44. Id. at 273, 837 P.2d at 866.
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Specifically, the court stated that the first degree murder category consists
of willful, premeditated, and deliberate killings and the second degree
murder category consists of killings without premeditation and deliberation, but with the knowledge that the killer's acts create a strong
probability of death or great bodily harm. 45 The court explained that the
second degree murder category includes rash and impulsive killings but
does not include deliberate killings.4 Thus, the supreme court's decision
in Garcia depended upon whether the evidence showed that Garcia deliberated or acted upon a rash impulse when he killed Gutierrez.
In Garcia, the supreme court applied the requisite standard of review,
as discussed earlier in this Note, for a denial of a defendant's motion
for a directed verdict, and held that there was insufficient evidence to
show that Garcia had deliberated before he killed Gutierrez. 47 Specifically,
the court stated that "[t]here was no evidence to support the jury's
conclusion that . . .Garcia decided to stab Gutierrez as a result of careful
thought; that he weighed the considerations for and against his proposed
course of action; and that he weighed and considered the question of
killing and his reasons for and against this choice.'"' The court reached
its conclusion by reasoning that all of the evidence presented tended to
support a rash and impulsive killing rather than a deliberate killing. 49
In its analysis, the court viewed the fist fight between Garcia and
Gutierrez as the State's only evidence of Garcia's state of mind just
before the stabbing.50 However, the court stated that this evidence supported a rash and impulsive killing rather than a deliberate killing.',
Furthermore, the court was not persuaded by the State's argument that
Garcia had formed a deliberate intent to kill Gutierrez when he and
Gutierrez walked from the back yard to the front yard of the house.5 2
Although the court did concede that Garcia had time to deliberate during
this walk, it ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to enable
the jury to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Garcia actually formed
a deliberate intent to kill while he walked from the back yard to the
front yard.53
Also, the court viewed Garcia's statement before the stabbing, "[riemove
Ray away from me or you're not going to be seeing him for the rest
of the day," as evidence of Garcia's intent to fight Gutierrez, but not
as evidence of his intent to kill Gutierrez.5 4 The only direct evidence
which influenced the court that Garcia had the intent to kill Gutierrez

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867.
Id.
Id. at 274-75, 837 P.2d at 867-68.
Id.
Id. at 275, 837 P.2d at 868.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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was his confession, "I told my brother I did him and I'd do him again." 5 5
The court noted, however, that Garcia's confession did not show that
he formed a deliberate intent to kill Gutierrez before the stabbing because
he confessed after the stabbing had occurred .16 After reviewing all of
the evidence presented by the State, the court held that there was informed the requisite deliberate
sufficient evidence to establish that Garcia
7
intent to commit first degree murder.1
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE GARCIA
DECISION

A. Comparison of Deliberate Killings with Rash and Impulsive
Killings
In Garcia, the court did not struggle with whether Garcia deliberated;
instead it had difficulty, with construing the term "deliberation" itself
as a distinction between first degree and second degree murder. For
example, the court did not clearly specify what type of evidence supported
a deliberate intent element required for first degree murder. Instead, it
only stated that "rash and impulsive killings" fall within the category
of second degree murder.5" However, this "rash and impulsive" classification, like the "deliberation" element, does not clearly distinguish
second degree murder from first degree murder.
For example, the supreme court has previously held in State v. Lucero5 9
and State v. Blea6" that no time is too short to deliberate. Moreover,
the Uniform Jury Instruction defining "deliberation" also states that a
deliberate intent can be formed within a short period of time. 6' This
implies that a killer could conceivably form a deliberate intent within a
matter of seconds. Therefore, it follows that a murder in which the killer
deliberated for just a few seconds is not clearly distinguishable from a
murder in which the killer has acted upon a rash impulse.
The court recognized this flawed reasoning in Garcia and commented,
"[b]ut what is a 'short period of time'? A second or two? If so, then
it is hard to see any principled distinction between an impulsive killing
and one that is deliberate and premeditated." 62 The court seems to imply
here that a deliberate killing requires more time than a rash and impulsive
killing, but the court does not specify how much time is required.
Furthermore, it does not indicate what evidence tends to show that a
killer acted upon a rash impulse. Consequently, the same confusion results
when the court uses the "rash and impulsive" classification to distinguish

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 274, 837 P.2d at 867.
Id. at 273, 837 P.2d 866.
88 N.M. 441, 541 P.2d 430 (1975).
101 N.M. 323, 681 P.2d 1100 (1984).
N.M. UNIF. JURY INSTRUCTION CRIM. 14-201.
Garcia, 114 N.M. at 275, 837 P.2d at 868.
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second degree murder from first degree murder as when it uses the
element of "deliberation" to distinguish between the two categories of
murder.
B. Need for Clear Guidelines to Help Establish What Evidence Will
Prove the Requisite Deliberate Intent to Kill for First Degree Murder
As stated earlier, there is a great disparity between the penalties imposed
for each classification of murder. 63 Because of this disparity, first degree
murder should be clearly distinguishable from second degree murder.
Although the supreme court recognized in Garcia the need for a clearer
distinction between the two classifications of murder, it did not specify
what evidence will support a deliberate intent to kill. The court did not
indicate what amount of time is sufficient to form a deliberate intent
to kill nor did it state what evidence will show that a killer has weighed
and considered the act of killing before carrying out this act.
The supreme court only indicated what evidence will not support the
deliberate intent to kill. The court's holding in Garcia suggests that
evidence of a fight in which the killer threatened the victim will be
insufficient although the killer had time to form the required deliberate
intent to kill. This holding provides inadequate guidance because evidence
of deliberation is still not clearly defined. In a practical sense, the Garcia
decision does not help prosecutors, defense counsel, or other courts with
the next murder case because uncertainty still exists as to what evidence
will help prove the deliberate intent to kill.
C. Analysis of Garcia Under Murder Statutes Contained in Other
Jurisdictions
The inevitable problem of construing the element of deliberation could
be eliminated altogether if the New Mexico murder statute did not contain
the deliberation element within its definition of first degree murder.
Instead, New Mexico should adopt a statutory scheme similar to those
enacted by Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Penal Code,
which do not use the deliberation element to define murder."
Neither Connecticut nor the Model Penal Code classifies murder into
two separate categories. 65 For example, the Connecticut statute provides
that a person will be guilty of murder if he or she intended to cause
the death of another person."
In Garcia, the supreme court found that Garcia stabbed Gutierrez with
the intent to kill him. 67 Accordingly, Garcia's intent to kill Gutierrez

63. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-18-14, 31-18-15(A)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1990).
64. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
65. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a(a) (West 1985); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (Official
Draft 1962).
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54a(a) (West 1985).
67. "[I]ndeed, we do not hesitate to say that the jury properly found, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Garcia stabbed Gutierrez intending to kill him, or at least with knowledge that his acts
created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm." Garcia, 114 N.M. at 275, 837 P.2d
at 868.
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would have been enough to convict him of murder under both the Model
Penal Code and the Connecticut murder statute without going into an
elaborate analysis of determining whether Garcia deliberated before he
killed Gutierrez. Under the Connecticut murder statute, Garcia would
have been convicted of a Class A felony and sentenced to somewhere
between twenty-five years to life imprisonment. 6 He then would not be
eligible for parole until he served at least twenty-five years of this
sentence. 69
Garcia could also have been convicted under.a statutory scheme which
categorizes murder into two separate degrees. For instance, both Delaware
and Illinois classify murder into first and second degree without distin70
guishing the two categories of murder using the deliberation element.
Delaware distinguishes first degree murder from second degree murder
with the elements of intent and recklessness. 7' Because Garcia had the
intent to kill Gutierrez, he would have met the culpability requirement
for first degree murder under the Delaware statute, which imposes life

imprisonment .72

Likewise, Garcia would probably have been convicted of first degree
murder under the Illinois statute because he had the intent to kill Gutierrez.
However, if Garcia could show that certain mitigating circumstances,
defined under the second degree murder statute, provoked Garcia to kill
Gutierrez, then Garcia would probably have been convicted of second
degree murder. In Illinois, the sentence for first degree murder is between
twenty and sixty years whereas the sentence for second degree murder
is between four and fifteen years. 73 A person convicted of first degree
murder is not eligible for parole until he 74or she serves at least twenty
years, less time credit for good behavior.
Although the penalties imposed with respect to each jurisdiction vary
from twenty years to life imprisonment, the overall statutory analysis for
determining whether a person is guilty of murder is much simpler. The
wide variation in sentencing for each separate jurisdiction illustrates that
a state legislature has the authority to impose a variety of punishments
for murder. It can choose to reserve the harshest penalty for first degree
murder, and more moderate punishment for murders in which mitigating
circumstances exist, or it can leave the sentencing to the discretion of
the courts. Thus, nothing is lost in terms of imposing punishment when
the deliberation element is eliminated from a first degree murder statute.
Therefore, the New Mexico Legislature may still punish someone using

68. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-35a(2) (West 1985).
69. Id. § 54-125.
70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (Repl. Vol. 1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/91(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 635 & 636.
72. Id. § 4209 (Repl. Vol. 1987). A person convicted of first degree murder must serve at least
one-third of the life sentence before becoming eligible for parole. Id. § 4346.
73. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
74. Id. para. 5/3-3-3.
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capital punishment, life imprisonment, or a lesser sentence without having
the courts or juries struggle with a "deliberation analysis."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The element of deliberation is a difficult term to construe. Although
the supreme court tried to clarify this term, the ultimate responsibility
to provide guidelines as to what evidence will show deliberation belongs
to the legislature. To avoid problems construing the deliberation term,
the New Mexico Legislature should eliminate the deliberation element
from its homicide statute and construct a statute similar to those adopted
in Connecticut, Delaware, and Illinois. If, however, the legislature elects
to retain deliberation as an element of first degree murder to distinguish
it from second degree murder, it should at least state what evidence will
support a deliberate intent to kill or list the crimes which will be punished
under each separate category of murder.
STEPHANIE M. GRIFFIN

